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Abstract 
In this paper, we first briefly review the recent literature on climate change, resource scarcity and 
conflict. This is then followed by introducing an agent based computational model based on the 
theory of production and conflict which is capable of simulating the dynamics of micro-level 
resource conflicts. The model considers differences in resource attributes, differentiates between 
conflict subjects, takes into account bounded rationality, nonlinearity and feedback loops, and is 
enriched by a set of scenarios ranging between mild to severe resource shocks. Our results show 
that agents tend not to get engage in conflict during mild resource scarcity scenarios as they adapt to 
the changes and since the decreases in returns to resource predation and increases in their protective 
practices act as negative feedback loops, discouraging resource predators from allocating further 
effort to predation. The model results also show that scarcity is more likely to encourage product 
predation rather than resource predation among the agents. 
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1. Introduction 
On December 8, 2009, a day after United Nations Climate Change Conference started in 
Copenhagen, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) published a paper by 
Marshall Burke and his colleagues claiming that the risk of civil war increases in Africa when the 
temperature is higher (Burke, et al., 2009). Almost a year later, the same journal published a paper 
by Halvard Buhaug (2010a) titled “Climate not to blame for African civil wars”, rejecting the 
results of Burke, et al. (2009). Few months later Burke and his colleagues responded to Buhaug’s 
paper (Burke, et al., 2010b) which in turn received a response from Buhaug (Buhaug, 2010b). 
Sutton et al. (2010) also published a letter in PNAS titled “Does warming increase the risk of civil 
war in Africa?”, raising concerns with the findings of Burke et al. (2009) which received a response 
later in the same year in an another letter to PNAS (Burke et al., 2010c). 
This is not an isolated or unusual exchange since academic debate continues on whether climate 
change might initiate new or intensify current conflicts (Salehyan, 2008; Scheffran, et al., 2012). 
Several recent studies were reported in the special issue of Journal of Peace Research where Nils 
Petter Gleditsch (2012, p.3) concludes: “Overall, the research reported here offers only limited 
support for viewing climate change as an important influence on armed conflict.”  
The editors of Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal 
Stability stated moreover that “climate change has no automatic effect on human security, on 
societal stability, or on violent conflict. Rather, there are multiple links in the chain between 
changes in the natural environment and these phenomena, which mitigate or multiply the effects of 
climate change” (Scheffran et al., 2012, p.797). 
This paper attempts to respond to a critical question that we believe has not been addressed 
comprehensively so far in the literature: Why, contrary to the theoretical perceptions and 
expectations, might climate change and its consequent resource scarcity not lead to conflict and 
when they do, why might climate-induced conflicts not be as severe as anticipated? 
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To respond to this question, instead of investigating case studies or analyzing large-N datasets 
which has caused controversy in this area so far, we present a theoretical computational model 
based on a well-known economic framework which, borrowing Schelling’s (1978) terms, associates 
individuals’ micro-motives with emergent macro-behaviors of conflict. 
Next section introduces the unsettled literature on the climate-conflict (CC) link and briefly reviews 
the current state of debate. After introducing our theoretical framework and analytical approach, the 
model is introduced and its verification and basic outputs are presented. Finally, the scarcity 
scenarios and their impacts on the results are discussed, followed by conclusions where we adress 
our primary research question.  
 
2. The Debate 
The security aspects of climate change have been highlighted by high-ranking policymakers and 
institutions. According to the Washington Post (Lynch, 2007), U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon first addressed the U.N. General Assembly on the issue in 2007, stating that future extreme 
climatic events such as droughts, floods our constant inundations may lead to scarcity of arable land 
and so drive war and conflict0F1. In September 2009, New York Times also published Barak Obama’s 
speech on climate change at the U.N. General Assembly, warning against “conflict in places where 
hunger and conflict already thrive” (Obama, 2009). In July 2011, The Guardian reported on a UN 
Security Council meeting discussing the formation of “green helmets” as a peacekeeping force to 
act when climate-induced conflicts occur (Goldenberg, 2011)1F2. 
                                                            
1 The full statement is available on the UN news centre at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21720&Cr=global&Cr1=warming 
2 For further details see: Security Council 6587th meeting documents at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10332.doc.htm 
DRAFT PAPER      4 
 
 
Researchers are not as confident as politicians, since the issue of resource-driven conflicts has been 
source of disagreement, when the impacts of both resource abundance and resource scarcity are 
investigated.  
In the final years of the last century, two studies, Sachs and Warner (1995) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998), caused a wave of academic debate by showing how natural resource abundance can lead to 
lower levels of economic growth and higher risks of war. 
Over the next decade, many studies tried to better investigate the channels which may link resource 
abundance to conflict and as time passed more evidence was presented concluding that in the 
majority of cases, it is the institutional capacity of a country or a region in managing its natural 
resource wealth which determines its growth and security, and not the resource abundance per se 
(Ross, 1999; Maxwell and Reuveny, 2000; Mehlum et al. 2006; Brunnschweiler, 2008; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009). 
The same story can be observed for resource scarcity. The potential links between resource scarcity 
and conflict, especially scarcity driven by climate change, have been discussed widely over the last 
couple of decades and almost every paper published in this area over the past few years has briefly 
or extensively reviewed how different studies have reached diverse, and sometimes even 
contradictory conclusions2F3.  
For instance, while authors such as Grossman and Mendoza (2003) and Homer-Dixon (1991 and 
1994) used theoretical and empirical models to associate resource scarcity and conflict, interestingly, 
many recent studies such as Adano et al. (2012), Benjaminsen et al. (2012), Butler (2012) and 
Buhaug and Theisen (2012) highlights the social, economic and political institutions as the main 
factors affecting the conflict decisions of individuals, communities or states. Raleigh and Urdal 
(2007, p.674) concluded that: “political and economic factors far outweigh those between local 
                                                            
3 We avoid repeating the entire literature here since it has been broadly covered by Theisen (2008), Salehyan (2008), 
Brauch (2009) and Scheffran et al. (2012).  
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level demographic/environmental factors and conflict”. Nevertheless, there are still studies 
published recently, showing how conflict is significantly affected by resource scarcity such as 
freshwater availability, land degradation and rainfall (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Urdal, 2008). 3F4  
In this paper, we apply a widely-used economic framework, called the theory of Production and 
Conflict 4F5 (P&C) and implement it by developing an agent-based computational model to examine 
what circumstances in which climate change might or might not cause conflict. 
 
3. Theory and Modeling Approach 
The building blocks of production and conflict theory are simple. According to this theory, 
economic entities do not merely allocate effort to produce goods and services, but they may also 
allocate some unproductive effort to predate others’ resources (raw materilas), final products, rights 
and wealth, or protect themselves from being predated by others (Hirshleifer, 1988; Grossman, 
1998, 2001).  
While these types of models were originally developed to study topics in property rights protection, 
later versions were applied to explore issues such as rent-seeking behavior and resource conflicts 
(Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Hausken, 2005; Lahiri, 2010; Muthoo, 2004).  
At least three studies have used this framework so far to explore the relations between resource 
access and conflict. Grossman and Mendoza (2003) presented an equation-based model of this 
theory where they found that resource scarcity, especially when it is transitory leads to further 
appropriative competition. Reuveny et al. (2011) developed a game theoretic model based on this 
theory and being able to replicate some of the real-world patterns and trends, concluded that 
“increasing the resource carrying capacity and growth rate intensifies the fighting” (p.709). Butler 
                                                            
4 Authors such as Hartmann (2010), Brauch (2009) and Oels (2012) have warned against the securitization of climate 
change. Slettebak (2012, p.163) satates that “one worrying facet of the claims that environmental factors cause conflict 
is that they may contribute to directing attention away from more important conflict-promoting factors, such as poor 
governance and poverty.” It has also been claimed that scarcity can even lead to cooperation among stakeholders and 
provide motivation for innovation in the affected communities (Dinar, 2009, 2011). 
5 As called by Hausken (2005) 
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and Gates (2012) also introduced a model partially based on this theory and showed that conflict is 
sensitive to property rights protection asymmetries.  
In order to analyze the complexity of conflict decision at the micro and macro level, we have 
applied an agent-based model to simulate how individuals interact in an environment where they 
can both produce and predate. Agent-based modeling is “the computational study of systems of 
interacting autonomous entities, each with dynamic behavior and heterogeneous characteristics” 
(Heckbert, et al., 2010, p.40). In economics, this approach is also known as Agent-based 
Computational Economics defined by Tesfatsion (2003, p.264) as “the computational study of 
economies modeled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents.”5F6  
In agent-based models, the computer provides a “flight-simulator-like interface” (Holland, 1992, 
p.29) where agents can represent entities such as individuals, communities, firms, cars, agricultural 
crops or climatic factors. Each agent is defined based on some features and functions and various 
embedded rules which control its actions and reactions. This approach provides the opportunity of 
taking into local interactions between heterogeneous autonomous players which can generate non-
equilibrium states which better explain the nature of a system (Epstein, 2006). 
Various studies have discussed the advantages of using agent-based models, including being able to 
address unsatisfactory features of conventional approaches such as the perfect rationality of the 
agents (Axtell, 2000). Agent-based models are highly flexible and so are better able to represent the 
“natural description of a system” (Bonabeau, 2002), especially when we want to present the human-
environment relations (Li and Liu, 2008). 
Many authors suggest that the conflict analyses should be undertaken at more disaggregated levels. 
Allouche (2011) believes that while long-term high-level data, such as international wars datasets, 
can provide insights into how scarcity may lead to conflict, moving toward applying short-term data 
                                                            
6 Other definitions and introductory material on ABM are presented by Axelrod (1997) and also the second volume of 
Handbook of Computational Economics (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006), Macal and North (2010), Heath et al. (2009) and 
Squazzoni (2009). 
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at more disaggregated levels can be more beneficial, especially when food and water security are 
studied. This has been echoed by other authors such as Nordås and Gleditsch (2007), Trombetta 
(2012), Scheffran et al. (2012), Hendrix and Glaser (2007) and Theisen (2008), who suggest that 
local, sub-national, small-scale and less intense conflicts should be taken in to account in CC 
analysis6F7.  
ABMs can also address the data limitation challenges that scholars face in CC research (Buhaug 
and Theisen, 2012; Scheffran et al. 2012), by providing the opportunity to run the model under 
different scenarios and study a range of possible outcomes. 
Moreover, analyzing the associations between climate change and conflict, we are dealing with a 
complex adaptive system (Brauch and Scheffran, 2012; Nardulli and Leetaru, 2012; Butler and 
Gates, 2012). Following Ramalingam et al.’s (2008) framework of defining a complex system, 
different features of complexity can be identified in our model:  
Firstly, conflict as discussed in this paper, is an interaction between at least two parties (Hirshleifer, 
1988) and so an agent’s decisions will directly and indirectly affect others’ conflict decisions. This 
interdependence among system actors may lead to the formation of feedback loops such as violence 
leading to further violence (Adano, et al., 2012). Also, as Trombetta (2012) discusses, assigning 
deterministic behavior to humans in CC models and then aggregating them, is one of the issues 
which needs to be corrected in these types of models since, as Grossman and Kim (2000) and 
Reuveny (2011) discuss, the complex outcomes of these models at the macro level emerge from the 
interactions among the individuals rather than decisions being aggregated. 
Secondly, nonlinear patterns of behavior have been found in at least at two different levels in CC 
models. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) show how there is a nonlinear relation between rainfall and 
social conflict in their studied group of countries in Africa and Scheffran et al. (2012) remind us of 
                                                            
7 It has been argued that what is concluded from micro-level conflicts can be considered as a warning for problems at 
higher levels of aggregation considering their “incremental destabilizing effects” (Nardulli and Leetaru, 2012, p.73). 
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the “possible tipping points” and “possible critical thresholds” that may exist in agents’ behaviors 
that are capable of triggering climate-induced conflicts.  
Conflict models also present high dependency on initial conditions and heterogeneity of features. 
Beardsley and McQuinn (2009) comprehensively studied the history and characteristics of two 
rebel groups in Asia, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia and the Tamil Tiger 
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE) in Sri Lanka and explore how the differences among the 
groups led to two totally different outcomes in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake 
and tsunami.  
ABMs have been widely used in modeling conflict, as presented by Rousseau and van der Veen 
(2005), Epstein (2002), and Bhavnani and Miodownik (2009) and Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris 
(2009, 2013). 
 
4. Model 
To ensure that the model is replicable, it is described using the Overview, Design concepts, and 
Details (ODD) protocol (Grimm 2006; Grimm, et al., 2010). The associated Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) diagrams (Booch, et al., 2005) are also provided as supplementary material. 
Among numerous platforms available for implementing an agent-based model, we have used 
NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999). Studies have shown that NetLogo is well equipped with the features 
necessary for modeling in the social sciences (Blikstein, et al., 2005; Railsback, et al., 2006).  
4.1. Purpose 
The main purpose of this model is to implement an agent-based environment which is capable of 
simulating effort allocation decisions between productive and conflict activities which is then used 
to investigate how resource scarcity is likely to affect agents’ effort allocation between production 
and predation. 
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4.2. Entities, state variables, and scales 
The model has four main entities including the agent, the network, the environment and the 
resource.  
Each agent represents an individual with six main variables. The variable mxage holds the 
maximum expected age of the agent. Over time age, which is initially 1, increases and when it 
reaches to mxage, the agent leaves child number of offspring and dies. child holds an integer with 
uniform distribution which minimum and maximum values are determined based on the population 
scenarios. mxage is a normally distributed random value. To associate agents’ allocation decisions 
with their heterogeneous attitude, each agent has a variable which determines its risk taking level, 
rsktl. When rsktl is higher, agents are more likely to allocate further effort to predation and less to 
protection. 
Over the simulation, agents select an effort allocation strategy from the pool of strategies. The 
strategy is represented using a bit vector [X1 X2 X3 X4], where:  X1 stands for a binary variable 
representing predation of resource type 1, X2 similarly represents predation of resource type 2, X3 
is for product predation and X4 shows whether the agents produces or not. So, if a bit is 1, the agent 
allocates effort to that option and if 0, it does not. For example, the [0 0 1 1] strategy means an 
agent predates other agents’ products along with producing itself. In the models which have just one 
type of resource, the first two bits are combined and the strategy takes the [X1 X2 X3] format. For 
simplicity, a strategy like [1 0 1] is presented as S101 from now on. 
Agents are connected to each other through an undirected incomplete network where if A is 
connected to B, B is connected to A as well. The connection priority is set so that agents will 
connect to the agents spatially closer to them. Sensitivity analyses show that while this does not 
affect the results, it improves the model interface. The links are fixed and if a link is broken for any 
reason the agent will not attempt to establish new links, unless all of them are broken. The average 
number of links an agent creates is proportional to the population. 
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The environment is a 50 × 50 bounded square grid where each cell is called a patch. Patches all 
have the same physical size in the model’s graphical user interface, representing an area able to 
accommodate only one agent. 
In our model, four different types of resources are studied. Land which represents agricultural land 
is a private resource which can be accumulated and stored by the agent over the long-term and be 
inherited between generations. Water-D represents a resource such as drinking water which has 
only consumption usage. It is a common resource and can be preserved over a predefined short-term. 
Water-P on the other hand has similar features to Water-D, but it represents irrigation water since it 
yields utility through the production function. Finally, Water-B (water for Both uses) can be directly 
consumed and can also be used in the production process.  
The resource scarcity scenarios are mainly controlled by two variables: 1) the Duration of the 
resource scarcity, D, and 2) the spatial Area which is affected by the resource scarcity, A. We also 
allow for single or multiple occurrences of scarcity, the impacts of which are discussed later. 
4.3. Process overview and scheduling 
The model runs for 25,000 ticks, where each tick is the smallest discrete unit of time in the model. 
During a tick there is a non-zero probability of all of the modules of the model being executed at 
least once. Model outputs are recorded every 10 ticks and the first 500 observations are discarded 
since they are highly affected by the initial conditions, finally leading to 2000 data points. Each 
agent goes through seven steps as described below:  
1. Measuring Insecurity: During each tick each agent measures the insecurity in its surrounding 
environment. Equation 1 shows how insecurity (insec) is measured for the agent i, at each point of 
time T, where attkdit-1 shows how intensively the agent i has been attachked predated in round t – 1. 
The intensity of predation is the previous rounds is determined by how much effort the predators 
have allocated to predate agent i.  
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݅݊ݏ݁ܿ௜் ൌ 1
1 ൅ ݁ିఙ∑ ቀ௔௧௧௞ௗ೔೟షభణ ቁ
೅ష೟శభ೅బ
 (1) 
In Equation 1, by using ൜െߪ∑ ቀ௔௧௧௞ௗ೔೟షభణ ቁ
்ି௧ାଵ
ଵ் ൠ, at every point of time (T), the agent takes into 
account his experience of being predated from time = 0 to time = T and measures a weighted 
average value of those experiences by giving more attention to more recent incidents. The process is 
adjusted using ϑ and σ. This is then taken to a logistic function to provide a nonlinear distribution of 
values between zero and one. After calibrating the module, we have selected ϑ = 0.02 and σ = 1.001 
based on the life-span of each agent.  
2. Allocate resources: Each agent has one unit of effort to allocate during each tick. The first 
decision an agent makes is about how much resources it wants to allocate to protection. Equation 2 
shows the resources allocated to protection (protn) based on insecurity (insec) and risk-taking level 
(rsktl) of agent i at time t. 
݌ݎ݋ݐ݊௜௧ ൌ ݅݊ݏ݁ܿ௜௧ ൈ ሺ1 െ ݎݏ݇ݐ݈௜ሻ (2) 
Considering Equations 1 and 2, agents who are more risk-averse and have been frequently attacked 
recently, allocate more effort to protection. 
After deciding on the amount of effort to allocate to protection, the agent is left with (1– protn) 
units of effort. This will be allocated between production, resource predation and product predation 
as shown in Table 1. In this table, the allocation of effort is presented when only one resource is in 
the model. If we have two types of resources, there are three steps for dividing the resource 
predation effort (rprdn): 1) agents measure how much of the resource of they have, 2) agents 
calculate how important each of these resources as a factor in their production function are, and 3) 
agents consider the average of both step 1 and step 2. So, each agent at any point of time measures 
the comparative benefit of predating Water-B against Land, and also considers how much Land and 
Water-B it already owns to decide how it should allocate its resource predation efforts. 
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Table 1: Effort allocation patterns based on the strategy selected by the agents 
 
Protection 
protn 
Production 
prodn 
R-Predation 
rprdn 
P-Predation 
pprdn 
S001 insec 0 0 0 
S001 insec 1 – protn 0 0 
S010 insec 0 1 – protn 0 
S011 insec 1 – (protn + predn) 0 (1 – protn) *  rsktl 
S100 insec 0 0 1 – protn 
S101 insec 1 – (protn + predn) (1 – protn) *  rsktl 0 
S110 insec 0 (1 – protn) / 2 (1 – protn) / 2 
S111 insec 1 – (protn + predn) ((1 – protn) *  rsktl) / 2 ((1 – protn) *  rsktl) / 2 
Strategy: SXYZ, where:  X = 1 if the agent predates other agents’ resources and 0 if it does not; Y = 1 if the agent 
predates other agents’ products and 0 if it does not; and Z = 1 if the agent engages in production and 0 if it does not. 
insec = Insecurity, protn = Protection, predn = Predation, rsktl = Risk-taking Level 
3. Predate resources: Equation 3 is an extended standard success function, showing how the subject 
of a particular conflict, such as the resource, is transferred from one agent to another during a 
conflict. For a conflict between agents i and j, the transfers from agent i to agent j are a function of 
their mutual predation and protection efforts and wealth, where θ is the predation factor and the 
relative value of σ and τ determines the effectiveness of the prey’s protective efforts against the 
attacker’s predatory effort. Wealth is measured as the accumulation of income. 
ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݂݁ݎ௜௝ ൌ
ݎ݌ݎ݀݊௝ఏ೔
ݎ݌ݎ݀݊௝ఏ೔ ൅ ሺߪ. ݌ݎ݋ݐ݊௜ఏ೔ ൅ ߬. ݎ݌ݎ݀݊௜ఏ೔ሻ
ൈ ݓ݈݁ݐ ௝݄
ఏ೔
ݓ݈݁ݐ݄௜ఏ೔ ൅ ݓ݈݁ݐ ௝݄ఏ೔
 (3) 
By including both the allocation options (predn and protn) and wealth (welth), we ensure the 
financial powers of the parties are considered as well as their individual effort. Predating resources 
takes place before the production in each tick so the stolen resources can be used. 
4. Produce: Equation 4 shows a Cobb-Douglas production function, where prodn represents the 
effort allocated to production, techy is the technology, spcln is the agent’s degree of specialization 
in production, welth is its wealth and resrs is its resources. 
݌ݎ݋݀݀௜௧ ൌ ݌ݎ݋݀݊௜௧ఈ ሺݐ݄݁ܿݕ௜௧ሺ1 ൅ ݏ݌݈ܿ݊௜௧ሻ. ඥݓ݈݁ݐ݄௜௧ሻఉሺ1 ൅ ݎ݁ݏݎݏ௜௧ሻఊ (4) 
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Total capital,	ሺݐ݄݁ܿݕ௜௧ሺ1 ൅ ݏ݌݈ܿ݊௜௧ሻ. ඥݓ݈݁ݐ݄௜௧ሻ, is measured by combining an agent’s access to 
technology with its degree of production specialization and its wealth (financial capital). In 
Equation 4, α, β and γ are random variables normally distributed in a way to ensure decreasing 
returns to production factors for the majority of agents. At the end, prodd will contain the total 
amount of goods produced by the agent i at time t.  
5. Predate production: The process of predating products is similar to what was discussed for 
resource predation, only the objects of predation are the products produced by the prey, rather than 
the raw material as in resource predation. 
6. Record: Over time, agents continuously observe their output based on different combinations of 
strategies and allocation levels and keep records of the strategy which on average yields the greatest 
returns, which is called the best strategy (bstry). In other words, bstry, which is initially set to [0 0 0] 
or [0 0 0 0], always contains the strategy with the highest outcome resulting from production and 
predation.  
The learning module is then implemented through three genetic operators: 1) a mutation which 
continuously introduces random changes into agents’ strategies, thereby guaranteeing that each 
agent tries different strategies while looking for the strategy yielding the highest returns; 2) a 
crossover between the parent’s strategy and the child’s strategy which provides strategy inheritance; 
and 3) another crossover which occurs between an agent’s most recent strategy and its best strategy 
(bstry), implementing the genetic learning process. The probability of each of these operations to 
occur is controlled using mutation-rate, inheritance-rate and crossover-rate, respectively. 
7- Check age and reproduce: at the final step, agents increase their age by one. If age is equal to 
mxage, new agents are born. The offspring select a new random location and inherit their parent’s 
resources, wealth, strategy and best strategy. The model stops if time is equal to 25000 ticks. 
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4.4. Design concepts 
As Grimm et al. (2010, p. 2765) mention, this design concepts section “does not describe the model 
per se” but it is an attempt to review the main “characteristics” of the model.  
Basic principles: As discussed earlier, the basic principles of actions and interactions in the model 
are based on the theory of production and conflict, which shows how effort can be allocated 
between productive and unproductive activities. 
Emergence: We expect the final resource allocation trends to emerge from individual actions and 
interactions rather than simply being the aggregation of micro-level effort allocation decisions. 
Adaptation: The adaptive traits in the model can be direct and indirect. One direct adaptation occurs 
when agents increase their protection in response to higher predation from their neighbors. Also, in 
response to the changes in the environment such as population, technology or resource access, 
agents can change their strategy and so their effort allocation patterns, to ensure that they gain the 
highest outcome. 
Objectives: The main objective of agent is to increase its outcome by taking into account its 
personal features such as risk taking level and its neighbors’ and environment’s characteristics.  
Learning: As our strategy framework revealed earlier, we have applied three genetic operators to 
embed learning in our agent. This allows us to easily change the number of strategies and at the 
same time to implement agents with bounded rationality, since they do not reflect on each strategy 
at every point of time (Brenner, 2006), but instead search for a better situation over time and are 
affected by a random process which manages the mutation and crossover probabilities. The strategy 
framework with genetic operator also enables us to have inter-generational learning.  
Prediction: The main prediction that the agent does is using a weighted measurement of its history 
of being-attacked to form expectations about future insecurity.  
Sensing: The agents detect the resource availability in the environment, the number of their 
neighbors, whether the patches are occupied or not, and other global values.  
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Interaction: The main interaction channel between the agents is through the predation process 
where resources or products are transferred between them. 
Stochasticity: The probability values for the genetic operators are considered to be random. Also a 
random variable is also embedded in the predation function to control the success rate of predation.  
Collectives: No collective actions are implemented in the model. 
Observation: Two main sets of variables are observed in the model, including the mean efforts 
allocated by all agents to each activity, production, resource predation, product predation and 
protection and the share of each strategy selected from the pool. 
4.5. Simulation Details 
The further details of the model, especially the initial conditions and sensitivity analysis are 
presented in this section. 
The model starts with 25 agents in a 50 by 50 cell environment. The main variables and their initial 
values are listed in Table 3. Resources, agents and their children are distributed randomly in the 
environment. The land regime is set in a way that the children can not only inherit land, but they 
can also gain their own land over time. The mean value of initial resources in each cell is 10 and the 
model has only one type of agent.  
The Cobb-Douglas production function powers from Equation 4, α, β and γ, are all distributed 
normally with mean = 0.3 and s.d = 0.05, which means that less than 10% of the entities experience 
constant or increasing returns to scale.  
4.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
We ran a set of sensitivity analysis simulations to select the appropriate initial conditions for some 
of the variables. As expected, changes in mutation, optimization and inheritance rates significantly 
affect the model outputs since they determine how frequently agents’ bit patterns are updated over 
time. High mutation and low inheritance rates increase the stochastic behavior, decreasing the 
opportunity for adaptation for agents, but at the same time improving their chances of finding the 
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most beneficial strategy. On the other hand, while frequent optimization can ensure that agents 
follow the best strategy, it prevents them from searching for global optimums.  
Based on the calibration results and considering each agents’ life cycle, the value of the mutation 
rate is set in a way to guarantee, on average, four mutations over its life time. Based on this, the 
optimization rate is set to ensure that between each two mutations, on average, ten optimizations are 
undertaken. Finally, the value of the inheritance rate is assigned to provide a 50% probability of the 
agent following its parent across the whole bit thread. 
The predation success rates for both product and resource are 25%. As expected, lower rates of 
predation success decrease agents’ interest in attacking others, but since lower predation is a factor 
encouraging agents to predate more as others protect themselves less and returns to predation are 
high, the success rate impacts are not as high as expected, but still statistically significant. 
Table 2: Sample initial conditions 
Title Value Title Value 
Environment Variables 
Resource Distribution  Random (Uniform) Agent Distribution Random (Uniform) 
Land Regime Increasing Child Placement Random 
Initial agents 25 Mean Initial Resource 10 
Agent Types 1 Simulation Length 25000 ticks 
Production Function Factors 
α (mean) 0.3 α (s.d.) 0.05 
β (mean) 0.3 β (s.d.) 0.05 
γ (mean) 0.3 γ (s.d.) 0.05 
Learning and Activity Rates 
Mutation Rate 0.04% per tick Max degradation rate 0.5% per tick 
Optimization Rate 0.4% per tick Cycle Length 50 ticks 
Strategy Trans Rate 50% per tick Risk Taking Level Uniform (0,1) 
PPred Success Rate 25% per tick RPred Success Rate 25% per tick 
Agent Variables 
Initial Strategy [0 0 0] Initial BEST [0 0 0] 
Average Children 1.5 Life Length N (2500, 300) 
Avg. Initial Wealth 5 Initial Technology 1 
Linking 5% Initial age Random ELIFE 
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Agents are each linked to 5% of the population in the environment. The impacts of different levels 
of connectivity are mixed. While a higher level of connectivity leads to an increase in the chances 
of predating, since the agents have more options to attack, it decreases the probability of one agent 
being predated by one specific neighbor over time and these forces neutralize each other and the 
changes in connectivity do not significantly affect the model output.  
4.5.2. Randomness Sensitivity Analysis 
The model is affected by two sets of factors. Firstly, the initial conditions which were reviewed in 
the previous section, as well as the random seed which is selected by the software package. 
NetLogo uses a pseudo-random number generating system which means that while the random 
numbers are “random”, their generation process is deterministic, so choosing the same random seed 
in different simulations ensures that the final thread of numbers produced will be the same. As these 
differences can affect our results, we checked how sensitive the model is to the random seeds, by 
running the model 30 times, each with a different random seed.  
The results are presented in Figure1. Here, there are one line for each x and y coordinate making a 
grid line of 900 crossovers when the lines cross. When a x crosses a y line, it produces a black area 
if the two seed outputs are statistically significantly different7F8. Then, we consider all of these 870 
values (900 observations minus 30 of them where a series is compared with itself) as one single 
dataset and test if the mean of this sample is more than 0.01 which is rejected at 99% concluding 
that there in not enough evidence to claim that the model outputs are significantly different under 
different random seeds. 
                                                            
8 When a series is compared to itself, we have manually taken the value to zero. 
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Figure 2: Trends of pure production (S001), pure product predation (S010), and pure resource predation (S100). 
Regressing the productive allocations against the strategies (excluding the S000), Table 3 shows 
that majority of the strategies have significant impacts on the agents’ productive effort allocation 
decision. As expected, the pure product predation strategy has the highest negative and the pure 
production strategy has relatively the highest positive impact on the productive allocations, while 
the dual production-predation strategies have lower or even insignificant effects. The insignificance 
of the triple and dual strategies is due to the fact that these strategies, by omitting the protective 
efforts, divide the rest of the effort between production and predation and so have unclear impacts 
on productive allocations. The insignificant effect of S100 is due to the fact that the strategy is not 
practiced by many agents and so its proportion value is close to zero. 
Table 3: Productive allocation against the main strategies 
Y: Productive Allocation  
Durbin-Watson stat 2.087326 Standard Error 0.007744 
R Square 0.957432 Observations 2150 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept 0.2866 0.05859 4.8932 
S001 0.2240 0.0628 3.5654 
S010 -0.1945 0.0690 -2.819 
S011 0.0985 0.0655 1.5023 
S100 -0.0770 0.1055 -0.7304 
S101 0.1072 0.0625 1.7131 
S110 -0.1670 0.0696 -2.3976 
S111 0.0545 0.0646 0.8442 
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Figure 3 presents the mutual resource allocation patterns between each pair of options. As expected 
there is a negative relation between production and each of predation options, and between 
protection and production, and both predation options lead to higher levels of protection.  
 
Figure 3: Mutual relations between any two effort allocation options for random observations. 
In addition to the presented outputs and also using NetLogo debugging capabilities, each module 
was tested separately, to ensure that the intended design is implemented correctly based on a simple 
version of what is called abstract interpretation (Hermenegildo, 2005) in computer science, as well 
as running the model under two sample agents to ensure correct communications and interactions.  
 
5. Scarcity Models’ Results 
The model provides us with an extended set of results which cannot all be presented in the course of 
this paper. As a result, we only discuss the major outputs.  
5.1. Land Scarcity 
In Figure 4 the vertical dash of lines indicate the start and the end of a medium-intensity resource 
shock period.  
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Figure 4: Changes in the efforts of all agents allocated to product predation (PPred) and percentage of product 
predators (S010) in the population in a simulation with medium shock 
Two main issues can be seen in the figure. On one hand, during the resource scarcity period, there is 
an upward trend in product predation resource allocation, which finishes as soon as the shock 
disappears. But this 25% increase in product predation is not unprecedented since as can be seen in 
the figure, between times 5100 and 5200 another increase with similar amplitude but shorter time 
period is experienced where no scarcity scenario is active. When the model is run under a set of 
weak, medium and severe scarcity scenarios and the average of all is measured, at 95% confidence 
level, the trends are similar to the models without any scarcity. 
To better explore the role of Land shocks in the changes observed in the predatory trend, we 
analyze the impulse responses in two different models. First, the model is run with one resource 
shock at a predetermined time (t = 1100), while in the second, the model is hit by four shocks (t = 
300, 700, 1100, 1400).   
Confirming our initial findings, analyzing the impulse impacts shows that in the majority of cases 
the changes in the allocation trends are temporary, if not insignificant and according to the results, 
less than 5% of the changes in effort allocation patterns can be attributed to the resource shocks. 
The model also shows that a single shock is more likely to cause a structural break in the effort 
allocation trends, compared to multiple shocks. 
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Water-D shock changes the average proportion of agents who prefer to be pure producers. As can 
be seen, when the affected area extends, more agents decide to leave the pure production strategy 
and become predator by enabling their predation bit. 
 
Figure 6: The final value for the proportion of pure producers in simulations with different levels of affected 
areas affected by the shock. 
To analyze the shock thoroughly, a set of impulse response tests was undertaken for all six main 
strategies (leaving out S000 and S100) to investigate the short- and long-run impacts of the shocks, 
at different levels of scarcity. Table 4 contains the results for these tests.  
Table 4: Agent populations’ selection of different strategies in reaction to the Water-D shocks for different 
spatial extents. NS = Not Significant, TD = Temporarily Decreasing, TI = Temporarily Increasing, PD: = 
Permanently Decreasing, PI = Permanently Increasing. 
 Strategy 
S001 S010 S011 S101 S110 S111 
Shock Extent 
(% of area) 
10% TD NS NS TI NS NS 
20% PD NS NS PI NS NS 
30% PD NS TD PI NS TI 
40% PD NS TD PI NS TI 
50% PD TD PD PI NS PI 
60% PD TD PD PI TI PI 
70% PD PD PD PI TI PI 
80% PD PD PD PI PI PI 
90% PD PD PD PI PI PI 
 
y = -9E-05x4 + 0.0023x3 - 0.0174x2 + 0.0032x + 0.3268
R² = 0.9999
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As the table suggests, at the lower levels of shocks the producer agents (SXX1) temporarily switch 
from just producing to predating Water-D as well as producing. At 20% level of shock, a similar 
impact is found, but this time it is permanent since a bigger group of agents experience the shock. 
As the shocks become more extensive the second group of non-resource-predating agents (S0XX) 
gradually joins the formerly-pure producers, by first temporarily and then permanently allocating 
effort to predating others’ resources. The results show that after the shock level passes 50% of the 
area, almost all non-resource-predating agents are affected, since they attack others to gain Water-D 
and survive. This becomes permanent when the shock is at its full extent, so model responses 
changes in the long term changes. 
To identify possible structural breaks, the Chow test is applied to the allocation trends. As presented 
in Figure 7, low intensity scenarios do not cause any breaks immediately after the shock, while 
when the shocks become severe, the model responds by a significant change in the output trends. 
 
Figure 7: Shock and structural breaks in a sample run with Water-D as the resource - single run. 
While the severe scarcity of a resource such as Water-D should lead to severe consequences for the 
agents, such as death, we did not allow the agents to die due to resource scarcity in the initial model 
in order to be able to follow the dynamics of their strategy selection over time. When we relax that 
constraint allowing the extremely thirsty agents die after passing a pre-defined threshold, the 
population trends react as shown in Figure 8. As the figure shows, while Water-D scarcity does not 
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affect population trends at low or medium levels of shock intensity, at higher levels the population 
drops very fast during the simulation. 
 
Figure 8: Final population and affected area in a Water-D model with death – 30 runs 
We relax another limitation by allowing the agents to move in response to Water-D scarcity, 
searching for resources in the environment. As can be seen in Figure 9 where the natural log of the 
number of movements is presented against the affected area, the number of movements increases 
exponentially as a result of increasingly severe resource scarcities. 
 
Figure 9: Changes in the number of moves in the model based on the different levels of scarcity – Multiple run.  
Migration is an effective strategy also as Figure 10 shows, in the models with the migration option 
active (white boxplots), the effort allocated to productive action has decreased less due to different 
extents of shock, compared to the equivalent cases where migration is not allowed (grey boxplots).  
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Figure 10: Decreases in productive allocation when migration is active (white) and inactive (grey). 
5.3. Water-P Scarcity 
Figure 11 shows how allocation trends react to a Water-P (such as water for production) scarcity 
scenario. As can be seen, during the shock, productive efforts are replaced by product predation, 
which increases gradually when the shock starts and to a large extent disappears after the shock 
finishes. As for the strategies, the significant increases in S010 (product predation) and S011 
(product predation and production) are considerable, while effort allocated to the pure productive 
strategy falls when the shock starts and returns to its top position when the shock fades out.  
 
Figure 11: Changes in a sample individual-run effort allocation due to Water-P shock – single run. 
Figure 12 shows how different levels of resource shock can affect the average proportion of effort 
allocated to production in a model with Water-P as the resource.  
MA1000 MA2000 MA3000 MA4000 MA5000 MA6000 MA7000 MA8000 MA9000
30
40
50
60
A
llo
ca
te
d 
E
ffo
rt 
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
5%
15%
25%
35%
45%
500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900
A
llo
ca
tio
n
Time
Prodn RPred PPred Shock
DRAFT PAP
 
As can be 
shocks, ch
shocks bec
efforts whe
According 
allocated t
overall resu
product pr
considering
time and so
We have a
If there ha
give the s
moving av
ER 
Figure 12: 
seen, the p
anges to alm
ome longe
n the basic
to the resu
o product p
lts show th
edation, si
 the fact t
 agents nee
lso tested f
s been a bre
cenario a s
erage of the
2
2
2
3
3
3
A
llo
ca
tio
n
Changes in t
roductive 
ost 30% i
r and affec
 scenario is
lts, the de
redation, s
at as for L
nce the ret
hat Water, 
d to consta
or the exist
ak immedi
core of 1, 
 data.  
15%
30%
5%
7%
9%
1%
3%
5%
Shock Area
27%
he average p
allocation w
n less inten
t a larger 
 compared 
crease in th
ince further
and, resour
urns to res
as a comm
ntly allocat
ence of a s
ately within
and otherw
45%
60%
75%
-29% 29%
 
roductive eff
hich was 
se shock sc
area. The 
with very s
e producti
 resource p
ce shocks t
ource pred
on resourc
e effort to i
tructural br
 100 ticks
ise 0. Th
400
5000
-31% 31
orts in Wate
more than 
enarios, th
results show
evere shock
ve efforts m
redation is
o Water-P s
ation decr
e in this m
ts predation
eak in the m
after the sh
e tests wer
3000
0 Sh
%-33% 33
r-P shocks m
35% in the
en to slight
 a 25% d
s.  
ainly lead
 not efficie
hift the eff
ease due to
odel, canno
. 
odel outpu
ock at 99%
e undertak
1000
2000
ock Duration
%-35%
ultiple run. 
 basic mod
ly over 25%
ecrease in 
 to more e
nt for the a
ort from pr
 the shoc
t be stored
ts over the
 confidenc
en using th
  27
 
el without
 when the
productive
ffort being
gents. The
oduction to
k and also
 for a long
 scenarios.
e level, we
e 100-tick
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DRAFT PAP
 
Figure 13: T
area with va
Figure 13 
increases a
less extens
in the effo
we did no
occurrence
5.4. Water
Figure 14 
resource fo
impacts of
produce or
and produc
while prod
ER 
esting for t
lue of 1, show
shows that
s well. In th
ive areas, b
rt allocation
t find any
.  
-B Scarcit
(top) illustr
r both co
 shock dur
 not.  The 
t predation
uct predatio
Sh
k
D
ti
he existence 
s scenario c
 as the sho
e results, n
ut with lon
 patterns b
 clear rela
y 
ates how p
nsumption 
ation and a
middle and
 trends rea
n increases
D1000
D2000
D3000
D4000
D5000
A
Sh
oc
k 
D
ur
at
io
n
of structura
ombinations 
cks becom
o structura
ger and mo
ecomes mo
tion betwe
roductive e
and produ
rea have s
 bottom pa
ct to the sca
 at high lev
1500 A3000
 
l break due 
which have 
e more pow
l breaks are
re extensiv
re likely. D
en the sho
fforts decli
ction, Wate
ignificant 
nels respec
rcity. Reso
els of shoc
A4500 A
Shock Are
to Water-P r
caused a stru
erful, the 
 experience
e shocks t
espite test
ck intensi
ne due to r
r-B. As ca
effects on 
tively show
urce preda
k intensity.
6000 A7500
a
esource shoc
ctural break
probability
d for limite
he existenc
ing for diff
ty and the 
esource sho
n be seen
the agents’
 how avera
tion does n
A9000
 
k scenarios.
. 
 of a struc
d shock du
e of a struc
erent scena
timing of
cks in a m
, again the
 decisions 
ge resourc
o change s
  28
 The dashed
tural break
rations and
tural break
rio setups,
 the break
odel with a
 combined
whether to
e predation
ignificantly
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DRAFT PAP
 
Figure 14: 
Resource Pr
ER 
Changes in 
edation; Bot
Shoc
A
llo
ca
tio
n
Sho
A
llo
ca
tio
n
Shock
A
llo
ca
tio
n
effort alloca
tom: Produc
10
00
20
00
40%
45%
50%
55%
k Duration
10
00
20
00
15%
20%
ck Duration
30
0040
0050
00
 Duration
tion due to 
t Predation
30
00
40
00
90%
40%-45%
30
00
40
00
90%
20
0030
00
15%
15%-20%
 
Water-B re
6075%
45%-50%
6075%
15%-20%
30% 45%
20%-25%
source shock
45%%
Shock A
50%-55%
45%%
Shock Are
60% 75%
Shock Are
25%-30%
s. Top: pro
15%30%
rea
15%30%
a
15%
20%
25%
30%
90%
a
 
 
 
ductive effo
  29
rts; Middle: 
DRAFT PAPER      30 
 
 
As we presented in previous cases, applying the impulse response tests shows that the impacts are 
only significant when severe shocks affect the model. 
5.5. Land and Water-B Scarcity 
To measure the possible impacts of parallel Land and Water scarcities on how agents allocate their 
efforts, different scenarios were designed based on low-, medium- and high-intensity Land and 
Water scarcity combinations. The model was then run 30 times and the average results over 
different random seeds were calculated separately for every scenario.  
According to the results, when the productive effort allocation is regressed against the scarcity of 
each resource, the coefficients are 0.004 and 0.003 for Land and Water, respectively. While the 
closeness of the values can be attributed to the fact that both resources, on average, have similar 
roles in linking the production function to scarcity, the larger coefficient of Land can be attributed 
to the agents’ abilities to preserve their Land over time, which makes its predation more desirable.  
Figure 15 shows how the productive allocation effort coefficients are distributed for Water and 
Land over the 54 scenarios. As can be seen, while the Land coefficient distribution is close to a 
normal distribution, the Water coefficient distribution is skewed. This shows that while Land, on 
average, contributes more to the production process in this model, its role in production is less 
sensitive to the scenarios, compared to Water which can generate utility via either predation or 
consumption.  
 
Figure 15: Distribution of regression coefficients for Land and Water 
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Individual regressions for each of the strategies were run against Water-B and Land levels in the 
model. The results are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5: Strategy selection changes resulting from Land and Water variations. Dependent variable = strategies, 
e.g. S0001 = f (Land, Water). SWXYZ: W: Water-B, X: Land, Y: Product Predation and Z: Production. 
SWXYZ Land Water R2 SWXYZ Land Water R2 
S0000 N/A N/A N/A S1000 
-0.00067 
(-47.8874) 
-0.00085 
(-11.5988) 
0.590902 
S0001 
0.00349 
(70.63291) 
0.002721 
(10.4183) 
0.739972 S1001 
-1.5E-05 
(-0.66624) 
-0.0021 
(-17.178) 
0.131499 
S0010 
-0.00083 
(-55.9514) 
0.000227 
(2.894349) 
0.597578 S1010 
-0.00095 
(-65.549) 
-0.00067 
(-8.74781) 
0.707277 
S0011 
0.000987 
(40.40638) 
0.001007 
(7.797153) 
0.493947 S1011 
0.000439 
(17.46697)
-0.00041 
(-3.07252) 
0.117016 
S0100 
-0.0002 
(-18.6174) 
-0.00012 
(-2.12893) 
0.160524 S1100 
-0.00025 
(-19.3265) 
-0.00094 
(-13.8646) 
0.284082 
S0101 
-0.00017 
(-6.96071) 
0.001391 
(10.97296) 
0.048042 S1101 
-0.00086 
(-44.0739) 
-0.00116 
(-11.3017) 
0.554038 
S0110 
-0.00044 
(-29.5389) 
-0.00028 
(-3.49163) 
0.325794 S1110 
-0.00057 
(-36.5186) 
-0.00089 
(-10.724) 
0.470349 
S0111 
0.000195 
(7.560805) 
0.002493 
(18.31933) 
0.203077 S1111 
-0.00027 
(-8.84087) 
-0.00055 
(-3.33685) 
0.053989 
 
According to the results, the pure production strategy, S0001, is significantly correlated with Land 
and Water access, enjoying the highest levels of significance and R2. This clearly shows that the 
number of producers decreases due to resource scarcity in the model. Pure product predation is 
negatively correlated with Land and positively with Water since Water scarcity shift efforts to 
resource predation rather than product predation. The positive, statistically significant and highly 
correlated coefficients for S0011 (production and product predation) illustrate the fact that during 
the time of scarcity, since production levels fall, there may not be enough incentives for agents to 
predate what others have produced, and it can also be due to the fact that this strategy is not capable 
of providing Water for direct consumption. 
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Pure resource predation strategies, S0100, S1000 and S1100, all increase due to scarcity, but since 
Land cannot generate utility individually, the R2 is much higher for the cases where Water 
predation is included in the strategy, S1XXX. 
Two more interesting findings can be observed in Table 5. First, S1010, or Water and product 
predation has a significant negative correlation with both Land and Water access. It seems that 
during times of scarcity, agents prefer to predate Water and the final product to survive, rather than 
Water and Land and produce themselves. The coefficients of S1101 (predating both resources and 
producing) and S1110 (predating both resources and product predation) are comparatively high, 
indicating that resource predation that is accompanied by either production or product predation 
seems to be a popular strategy when resources get scarcer. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
It is widely believed that climate-induced resource scarcity is the main factor causing climate-
driven conflicts. Applying the theory of production and conflict and using agent-based modeling 
enabled us to address three challenges that have been highlighted in the literature. First, following 
the suggestions by many researchers in this field, we applied disaggregated analysis to investigate 
the possible links between climate change and conflict. Secondly, we addressed a challenge 
highlighted by studies such as Theisen et. al (2011) and Scheffran et al. (2012) as we considered 
different levels of intensity for resource scarcity. Finally, we took into account the complexities 
involved in modeling conflict which arises from the interactions, feedback loops, thresholds and 
nonlinearities which exist when conflict decisions are made. 
In line with empirical studies such as Theisen (2008) and Raleigh and Urdal (2007), which claim 
that only high or very high levels of land and water scarcity are likely to cause conflict, we showed 
that while low levels of scarcity does not affect the effort allocation patterns significantly and 
medium-level scenarios only cause temporary changes in the dynamics of allocation, when the 
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As was shown and discussed across the paper, higher order polynomials are more successful in 
capturing the trends and relations of the agents’ conflict decisions, highlighting the nonlinearities 
and thresholds that may exist in real world when individuals or communities respond to climate-
driven resource scarcity. 
Considering our model results, it is time to respond to our main research question, namely: “Why, 
contrary to the theoretical perceptions and expectations, might climate change and its consequent 
resource scarcity not lead to conflict and when they do, why might climate-induced conflicts not be 
as severe as anticipated?” We highlight four main factors: 
1. The first factor that discourages agents from predating others’ resources or products is the 
protective efforts undertaken by the agents being attacked. Protection decreases the returns to 
predation for the predator in our model and a virtual economic limit emerges from such a reaction 
which acts as a negative feedback loop.  
2. Our results can also be attributed to the adaptive actions which are undertaken by the agents. In 
the other words, agents know that when resource access levels decrease temporarily, adaptation can 
be a better solution than predation. Interestingly, when agents are equipped with better adaptation 
capabilities, such as being able to migrate to unaffected areas, resource scarcity even leads to less 
increase in conflict than when migration is unavailable. 
3. Beyond the protective and adaptive capacities which can decrease the drivers for conflict, as has 
been mentioned in the literature (Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Theisen, 2012; Witsenburg and Adano, 
2009) and investigated in our paper, decreases in resource access or health levels acts as a negative 
feedback loop itself, discouraging the agents to predate others.  
4. To our knowledge, this is the first study which has separated the objects of conflict showing that 
when resource become scarcer, it is more likely for a conflict to occur over the products made out 
of a resource rather than the resource itself. Among different types of resources, the agents would 
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engage in conflicts mainly over more vital, more durable, more easily storable, and more privately 
owned resources. 
This model can be improved and extended by adding institutions such as government and also being 
modified to match the conditions of a specific country or region. 
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